Evidence-Based Regulation and the

Translation from Empirical Data to Normative

Choices: A Proportionality Test by Lochem, P. (Peter) van & Gestel, R. (Rob) van
Evidence-Based Regulation and the
Translation from Empirical Data to Normative
Choices: A Proportionality Test
Peter van Lochem & Rob van Gestel*
Abstract
Studies have shown that the effects of scientific research on
law and policy making are often fairly limited. Different rea-
sons can be given for this: scientists are better at falsifying
hypothesis than at predicting the future, the outcomes of
academic research and empirical evidence can be inconclu-
sive or even contradictory, the timing of the legislative cycle
and the production of research show mismatches, there can
be clashes between the political rationality and the econom-
ic or scientific rationality in the law making process et
cetera. There is one ‘wicked’ methodological problem,
though, that affects all regulatory policy making, namely:
the ‘jump’ from empirical facts (e.g. there are too few organ
donors in the Netherlands and the voluntary registration
system is not working) to normative recommendations of
what the law should regulate (e.g. we need to change the
default rule so that everybody in principle becomes an
organ donor unless one opts out). We are interested in how
this translation process takes place and whether it could
make a difference if the empirical research on which legisla-
tive drafts are build is more quantitative type of research or
more qualitative. That is why we have selected two cases in
which either type of research played a role during the draft-
ing phase. We use the lens of the proportionality principle in
order to see how empirical data and scientific evidence are
used by legislative drafters to justify normative choices in
the design of new laws.
1 Introduction
Most legislative drafters in the Netherlands have a pre-
dominantly doctrinal perspective on law and legislation
and have to learn most of the tricks of the trade of how
to transform policy into law in daily practice. This is
because law school training is still mainly focused on the
role model of the judiciary and (doctrinal) textual inter-
pretation methods of judges and solicitors.1 In the train-
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1. J.B.M. Vranken, ‘Methodology in Legal Research and Legal Practice. A
Comparison of Judge and Legal Academic’, in M. Groenhuijsen, E. Hon-
ee programme for legislative drafters of the Academy for
Legislation (AL) in The Hague, there is a bit more
attention for the relationship between law and policy
and for sociolegal research.2 Even in the curriculum of
the AL, however, there is little attention of how to
interpret and use empirical data in designing new laws
and regulations.3 This is probably no different else-
where in Europe,4 even though the ability to translate
policy into law is seen as one of the most important tal-
ents that drafters should possess. In the United King-
dom, Page interviewed members of the Office of the
Parliamentary Council responsible for legislative draft-
ing. One of them formulated it as follows:
Sometimes you can recruit a wonderful young law-
yer. You give them a draft that you have been work-
ing on and they rip it all apart brilliantly. But you
give them a set of instructions and ask them to write a
draft themselves and they sit staring at the wall and
won’t know where to start. It’s an analytical thing, it
is actually rather different from being just a good
lawyer.5
One of the most difficult things for draftsmen to master
is the analytical capacity to transform the objectives,
logic and structure of what policymakers intend into a
legislative language that is comprehensible, executable
and enforceable. The importance of designing laws that
will actually work is underlined by an increasing empha-
sis in both theory and practice on ex ante evaluation of
legislation and evidence-based lawmaking.6 Ex ante
dius & A. Soeteman (eds.), Recht in geding II (Boom juridisch: Den
Haag; 2016), at 15-25. W.J.M. Voermans, ‘Waarom is er zo weinig
wetgevingsonderwijs in de universitaire rechtenopleiding?’, 30(2)
RegelMaat (2015), at 68-80.
2. Seewww. academievoorwetgeving. nl. More in-depth: N.A. Florijn, ‘De
postinitiële masteropleiding tot wetgevingsjurist: opzet, resultaten en
toekomst’, 30 RegelMaat (2015), at 81-94.
3. See F. Leeuw, ‘Empirical Legal Research: The Gap between Facts and
Values and Legal Academic Training’, 11(2) Utrecht Law Review
(2015), at 19-33.
4. See E. Rubin, F. Uhlmann & M. Bouwes, De opleiding van wetgevings-
juristen en wetgevingsonderzoekers in vergelijkend perspectief (Pread-
viezen Vereniging voor Wetgeving en Wetgevingsbeleid; 2011).
5. E. Page, ‘Their Word is Law: Parliamentary Counsel and Creative Policy
Analysis’, (4) Public Law (2009), at 797.
6. M. Antokolskaia, ‘Van politiek gestuurde wetgeving naar evidence-
based wetgeving: Nog een lange weg te gaan’. in W. van Boom, I. Gie-
sen & A. Verheij (eds.), Capita Civilogie. Handboek Empirie en Privaat-
recht (Boom Juridische uitgevers 2013), at 174 describes this move
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evaluation is a way to investigate whether the assump-
tions underlying a legislative draft are based on facts and
empirical evidence that support the aims of the pro-
posed bill.7 Unfortunately, many things can go wrong in
this process.8
Cserne, for example, mentions the following: (1) episte-
mic concerns related to how empirical research is gener-
ated (e.g. validity issues but also concerns about what to
do with inconclusive or contradictory research out-
comes), (2) institutional features regarding how know-
ledge is channelled into the legislative process (e.g. how
political opportunism may influence the interpretation
of research outcomes) and (3) normative considerations
related to counterfactual behaviour (e.g. decisions based
on emotion or human instinct) and non-instrumental
goals (e.g. symbolic features of laws and regulations).9
Moreover, as Rachlinski has rightfully stated, the whole
idea of evidence-based law is highly controversial in
itself because of the fact that the legislative process is
controlled by different, often competing, rationalities.10
2 Research Questions,
Approach and Order of the
Argument
Empirical studies of important social phenomena often
do not provide clear and unequivocal answers and laws
may have conflicting purposes, which makes the rela-
tionship between policy problems, causes and remedies
highly problematic. Moreover, outcomes of scientific
towards ‘evidence-based legislation’ as: ‘the legislator in his choices for
legislative interventions takes a rational and focused approach and does
not let himself be guided by just political and ideological reasoning, but
also by relevant results of scientific inquiry assessing the (expected)
effectiveness of those interventions.’ See also R. van Gestel, ‘Evidence-
Based Lawmaking and the Quality of Legislation: Regulatory Impact
Assessments in the European Union and the Netherlands’, in H. Schäffer
and J. Iliopoulos-Strangas (eds.), State Modernization in Europe (Berlin-
er Wissenschaftsverlag 2007) 141, who defines evidence-based legisla-
tion as: ‘laws and policy initiatives are to be supported by research evi-
dence and policies are preferably introduced on a trial and error basis.
Implementation should only be considered on a larger scale after an
evaluation of experiments or pilots have taken place.’
7. See J. Verschuuren (ed.), The Impact of Legislation: A Critical Analysis
of Ex Ante Evaluation (Leiden/Boston; Brill; 2009) and more recently:
S. Naundorf and C. Radaelli, ‘Regulatory Evaluation Ex Ante and Ex
Post: Best Practice, Guidance and Methods’, in U. Karpen and H. Xan-
thaki (eds.), Legislation in Europe, Oxford: Hart publishing (2017), at
187-213.
8. See, e.g. N. Huls and N. Jungmann, ‘Bedoelde en onbedoelde effecten
van de Wsnp, in het bijzonder op crediteurengedrag’, in W.H. van
Boom, I. Giesen & A.J. Verheij (eds.), Gedrag en privaatrecht (BJU: Den
Haag 2008), at 487-503.
9. P. Cserne, ‘Introduction: Legislation, Legal Episteme, and Empirical
Knowledge’, 1(3) The Theory and Practice of Legislation (December
2013), at 387-93.
10. J. Rachlinski, ‘Evidence-Based Law’, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 901 (2011).
Important rationalities, apart from the scientific rationality, are the polit-
ical, legal and social-economic rationality. See I. Snellen, ‘Conciliation of
Rationalities: The Essence of Public Administration’, 24(2) Administra-
tive Theory & Praxis (2002), at 323-46.
studies sometimes conflict with deeply held moral and
political beliefs.
Regarding the latter, one just needs to think about psy-
chological studies showing that people often do not act
in their own best interest with regard to financial deci-
sions, matters of healthcare or private safety, which is
often seen as a reason for policymakers and legislators to
nudge them into doing what is considered best for
them.11 This approach associated with a politics of ‘lib-
ertarian paternalism’ conflicts with liberal views on ‘per-
sonal autonomy’ in which people are seen as responsible
for their own actions even if these may sometimes be
harmful for themselves (e.g. drinking, smoking, danger-
ous sports etc.).12 We do not intend to take position in
this debate but are interested in how different types of
empirical research are used in the text and explanatory
memoranda of proposals for new legislation when it
comes to making normative choices, such as a duty to
inform consumers, the granting of rights or a prohibi-
tion to conduct certain behaviour.
2.1 Research Questions
An interesting way to study the ‘translation’ from the
empirical to the normative is to view legislative drafts
through the lens of the proportionality principle, which
is one of the principal standards for assessing the quality
of legislation in the Netherlands.13 Proportionality
review is part of the directives on legislative drafting,
which require that proposals for new legislation are suit-
ed to accomplish the aims of the legislature, do not
require more intrusive measures than strictly necessary
to reach these aims and will not produce excessive bur-
dens for particular addressees of the rules.14
The proportionality principle has two faces. It concerns
the relationship between means and ends in law and pol-
icymaking (e.g. a certain policy measure suitable to
accomplish a regulatory goal), but, it also contains nor-
mative considerations. Suppose, for example, that a pro-
posed piece of legislation limits the rights and freedoms
of certain citizens, which are protected by the Dutch
constitution or the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR), drafters will need to make sure that the
intrusion on fundamental rights is both lawful and pro-
portionate. If they do not succeed in doing so, there is a
risk that courts will later on strike down this national
piece of legislation because it conflicts with supranation-
al law.
11. R. Thaler and C. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health,
Wealth, and Happiness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
12. C. Sunstein, Why Nudge: The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism (New
Haven: Yale University Press 2014). See for an early critique: G. Mitch-
ell, ‘Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron’. 99(3) Northwestern Uni-
versity Law Review (2005), at 1245-1277, available at: https:// ssrn.
com/ abstract= 615562.
13. See A view on legislation, Parliamentary Papers II 190-1991, 22008,
nr. 2, at 8. Directive 2.11 of the Directives on legislative drafting (digi-
tally available at: http:// wetten. overheid. nl/ BWBR0005730/ 2018 -01
-01). See also M.T. Bouwes, ‘Het proportionaliteitsbeginsel in het wet-
gevingsbeleid’, 28(3) RegelMaat (2013), at 148-65.
14. Criteria for proportionality review can be found throughout the Direc-
tives. See for instance 2.3, 2.5, 2.10 and 2.11. The directives can be
found at: http:// wetten. overheid. nl/ BWBR0005730/ 2018 -01 -01.
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Important to know is that proportionality is not only
used as a criterion for the ex ante evaluation of legisla-
tive drafts.15 It also functions as a standard for the ex
post review of legislation by courts.16 It is needless to
say that the possibility of judicial review of legislative
interventions may give ex ante evaluation additional
‘bite’, especially in case the outcomes of the ex ante
evaluation are sufficiently accurate to predict whether
there are going to be proportionality issues in the future
that will not be accepted by courts.
We have selected two legislative drafts in order to learn
whether there might be a difference in how legislative
drafters deal with (qualitative and quantitative) empiri-
cal research in justifying the proportionality of regulato-
ry interventions. The first draft concerns a more policy-
driven technical (traffic) legislation, the second one a
dossier concerning a (morally) sensitive topic, namely
the protection of children in cases of intimate partner
homicide by one of their parents. As we will explain
more in-depth later, we realise that only two case stud-
ies do not justify bold conclusions, but that is also not
our intention. We simply want to explore if the propor-
tionality lens, which we will outline hereafter,17 could be
a useful tool to analyse the way in which quantitative or
qualitative empirical research is translated into norma-
tive legislative decisions.
Our study is also limited in the sense that we will
restrict ourselves to the motivation about the use of
empirical research provided in publicly accessible docu-
ments that can be found via the Dutch central legislative
database.18 Special attention will be paid to the analysis
of the legislative drafts by the Council of State as the
principal advisor of the government on legislation, while
also being the highest administrative court in the Neth-
erlands. This dual role is interesting because in its judi-
cial capacity, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division
(AJD) of the Council of State also has to assess the pro-
portionality of legislation ex post when a piece of legisla-
tion is challenged in an individual case against the gov-
ernment.19 The overarching question we will try to
answer is:
To what extent is available empirical research used in
explanatory memoranda of two different legislative
drafts, namely the introduction of an alcohol lock
programme in traffic law and the protection of chil-
15. See L.F.M. Verhey, ‘Proportionaliteit als toetsingsmaatstaf’, RegelMaat
(2013-3), at 145-47.
16. See D. Harvey, ‘Towards Process-Oriented Proportionality Review in
the European Union’, 23(1) European Public Law, (2017), at 93-121.
17. There is an enormous body of literature on the proportionality principle
and proportionality review that we cannot discuss separately in this
paper. See for a recent overview: V. Jackson and M. Tushnet (eds.),
Proportionality: New Frontiers, New Challenges (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press; 2017).
18. Seewww. overheid. nl.
19. This is called ‘exceptieve toetsing’, which is a type of judicial review
where administrative courts assess the underlying legislation in a proce-
dure against an individual governmental decision (besluit) by way of
assessment whether the piece of legislation runs against fundamental
rights or legal principles. See, e.g. ABRvS 13 June 2017, ECLI:NL:RVS:
2017:1547.
dren in cases of intimate partner homicide, in order
to justify normative legal choices, viewed through the
lens of the proportionality principle?
This main question will be divided into three sub-ques-
tions: (1) Is there a difference in how the results from
qualitative and quantitative studies in the investigated
cases play a role in the explanatory memoranda to justify
normative choices, judged from a proportionality per-
spective? (2) Is there relevant empirical evidence miss-
ing in the explanatory memoranda or is the evidence not
presented in a balanced manner and, if so, is this signal-
led in the ex ante evaluation of legislation by the Coun-
cil of State as the organisation primarily responsible for
the scrutiny of legislative drafts? (3) How could the pos-
sible neglect of (certain types of) empirical evidence be
explained?
2.2 Selection of Cases
As already mentioned above, we are interested in possi-
ble differences between how quantitative empirical
studies and qualitative sociolegal studies are used in leg-
islative drafts from a proportionality perspective. In
order to do this, we have selected two cases in which
empirical studies were used to underpin and justify cer-
tain policy decisions by the legislature.
As a first case, we have looked for a problem of drunken
driving, especially the legislation of the so-called ‘Alco-
hol lock programme’ (hereafter: alcolock). The advant-
age of a somewhat older case (2008) could be that it pro-
vides additional insight into the effectiveness of this leg-
islative measure after enactment because there will
probably be articles, reports and court cases available
about this piece of legislation. At the same time, this is
reason for caution because as researchers we should try
to avoid hindsight bias and focus on what legislative
drafters could and perhaps should have known at the
time they wrote the draft.
The studies in the alcolock case are predominantly acci-
dent data and statistics that are predominantly quantita-
tive in nature. Furthermore, this case represents a more
classical instrumentalist type of traffic legislation where
regulatory decisions are supposed to implement policies
with regard to prevention of alcohol abuse by motorists.
On the basis of what we know about how legislative
drafters are educated and how the legislative process
works, one would expect the qualitative research in this
policy-driven legislative draft to be less visible and
explicitly used to account for the normative choices
being made. The main reason would be that draftsmen
usually do not have a background in social science
research methods, but are trained in law school in con-
ducting doctrinal (textual interpretation) methods.20 As
20. K. Kraan and B. Niemeijer, ‘De opleiding tot overheidsjurist’, in M. Ahs-
mann et al. (eds.), Herijking van de juridische opleidingen (Preadviezen
NJV, Deventer: Kluwer 2018), at 93-129. E.L. Rubin, R. Uhlmann &
M.T. Bouwes (eds.), De opleiding van wetgevingsjuristen en wetge-
vingsonderzoekers in vergelijkend perspectief, Preadviezen Vereniging
voor Wetgeving en Wetgevingsbeleid (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publish-
ers; 2011).
122
ELR november 2018 | No. 2 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000103
Vick has argued, it is likely for (traditional) lawyers that
information concerning alien disciplines or methods
they are not familiar with cannot be transformed into
knowledge compatible with the schemata they already
possess. Therefore, Vick seems to believe that the closer
the alien (empirical) information is to the type of
research/data that lawyers are familiar with, the more
likely it is going to be that this information will not be
ignored.21 From this perspective, one would expect that
quantitative empirical research stands little chance to be
taken into account, even if the legislative draft itself
concerns a rather policy-driven topic in which the dom-
inant concern for both policymakers, legislative drafters
and the wider public is going to be: will the alcolock
serve its purpose?
The second case concerns a more recent (2016) niche
topic at the intersection of criminal law and family law
with a strong ethical and moral dimension, namely, the
protection of children in cases of intimate partner homi-
cide by one of their parents. This case is about the right
to custody as well as how to deal with conflicts between
different sides of the family about the placement of the
children and regarding contact with the perpetrating
parent in prison. The focus of the research on this prob-
lem is mostly qualitative. It concerns mainly sociolegal
studies, based on interviews of persons involved in part-
ner homicide as perpetrator, children of perpetrators or
caregivers. From a moral perspective, this is a rather
sensitive topic. Based on the assumption formulated by
Vick that ‘methodological closeness’ is the determining
factor with regard to how decisions made in the legisla-
tive draft (e.g. the voluntary or involuntary contact with
the perpetrating parent) are justified by reference to
empirical research, one would expect that the sociolegal
research in this dossier will play a more prominent role
than the quantitative empirical research in the alcolock
case. The fact that the draft concerns a more sensitive
topic should not really matter then.
The latter does not mean, though, there can be no alter-
native explanations for potential differences between the
ways in which empirical research is used in the drafting
of legislation in both cases. Because of this, and due to
the fact that we were able to study no more than two
legislative drafts more in-depth, we will also look into
the literature on evaluation use after the analysis of our
two legislative drafts. This will be done in order to see
what possible other explanations might be available to
clarify why empirical research has (not) been used in the
drafts to support the proportionality of the legislative
measures.
2.3 Methodology: Looking through the
Proportionality Lens
The proportionality principle is a mechanism to scruti-
nise administrative or legislative measures.22 It is seen as
‘a trade-off device which helps resolve conflicts between
21. D.W. Vick, ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’, 31(2) Journal
of Law & Society (2004), at 189-90.
22. R. Gestel and J. de Poorter, ‘Putting Evidence-Based Law Making to the
Test: Judicial Review of Legislative Rationality’, 4(2) The Theory and
different norms, principles and values’.23 A function of
the proportionality principle is to guide the balancing of
conflicting rights and interests. Stone Sweet and Math-
ews have operationalised the principle by identifying
three analytical steps to balance facts and normative
considerations,24 namely, (1) is a certain measure suitable
to achieve the goal(s) set out by the legislature, (2) is it
necessary in the sense that there are no less intrusive
alternatives available to reach the policy goals and (3) are
the costs not excessive in comparison with the benefits of
the selected measure?25
We are not going to evaluate the two legislative drafts
against the three just mentioned criteria ourselves.
Instead we are going to study whether legislative
drafters use empirical data to support the different ele-
ments of the proportionality review. In doing so, one
has to realise that for the study of our two cases, the
suitability question could never be answered with com-
plete certainty anyway because as long as a legislative
draft is not implemented, the real-life consequences are
uncertain. However, what is possible is to study the
assumptions underlying a proposed regulatory measure
in order to see if these are based on solid data and relia-
ble empirical evidence. If this is not the case, one cannot
‘prove’ that the measures will be ineffective, but it can
be argued that a draft is most likely not going to have
(all) the intended effects because the assumptions on
which the draft is based are flawed.
In our analysis of the legislative files, we have focused
on the references to empirical data and scientific
research in the explanatory memorandum. Do the data
and/or empirical studies actually support the factual
assumptions and claims in the text of the draft and in
the explanatory memorandum or is the interpretation
perhaps one-sided or otherwise clearly inaccurate? We
will also study whether the Council of State has looked
into this and, if so, how the evidence was assessed.
Moreover, via a literature search, we will double-check
whether there are relevant studies that have not been
mentioned in the explanatory memorandum but could
have shed a different light on the topic. We used key-
words (e.g. alcohol lock, alcolock, alcoholslot and (inti-
mate) partner homicide, partner murder, partner vio-
lence etc.) to search databases, such as WorldCat, Klu-
werNavigator, HeinOnline, Westlaw, Google Scholar)
to look for studies that were not mentioned in the drafts.
The idea is to find out whether easily accessible and rel-
evant studies may have been (deliberately) overlooked or
ignored by the drafters. Such behaviour could be a sign
that other, more strategic, considerations impact the use
of empirical research.
Practice of Legislation (2016), at 155-85, doi:10.1080/205088
40.2016.1259899.
23. T. Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law’,
16(2) European Law Journal (2010), 158-85, at 165.
24. See for instance A. Stone Sweet and J. Mathews, ‘Proportionality Bal-
ancing and Global Constitutionalism’, 47 Columbia Journal of Transna-
tional Law (2008), at 73-164.
25. See for instance J. Jans, ‘Proportionality Revisited’, 27(3) Legal Issues of
Economic Integration (2000), at 239-65.
123
Peter van Lochem & Rob van Gestel doi: 10.5553/ELR.000103 - ELR november 2018 | No. 2
Next, we will move to the necessity of the regulatory
measures and how these are accounted for. Assessing
the necessity of proposed regulatory instruments always
requires some kind of study of possible alternative
measures that could be used to reach the same goals. If
there is a choice between several in principle equally
suitable and effective measures, the proportionality
principle requires that the least onerous one should be
selected.26 This presupposes a regulatory impact assess-
ment in which alternative measures have been studied.
Does the explanatory memorandum explicitly refer to
an impact assessment or to any other (empirical) method
of ex ante evaluation in which alternatives have been
studied? If not, does the Council of State signal this? In
case the Council does not, is that even noticed by the
House of Representatives?
The last step is to analyse whether effects of a draft are
not excessive in relation to the interests affected. As
Andenas and Zleptnig have argued, it is here where a
true weighing of competing objectives takes place. The
more intense the restrictions or the higher the costs for a
particular interest, the more important the justification
for the countervailing interest and benefits needs to
be.27 This last test is undoubtedly the most controversial
one.28 The objective is to examine whether the severity
of the harm to the individual, and the reasons of general
interest justifying it, are reasonably proportional to each
other.29 There is no objective yardstick to weigh these
different interests, which is why this test is so often
criticised. We are not going into that here, though,
because our intention is merely to study whether and
how empirical research has played a role in the balanc-
ing of costs and benefits as accounted for in the explana-
tory memorandum. Is there, in other words, an explicit
reference to how costs and benefits are weighed and is
there a reference to empirical data of scientific (e.g. eco-
nomic) research here? It is not up to us to decide
whether a fair balance has actually been struck between
costs and benefits. What we like to learn is if legislative
drafters support cost–benefit analysis with empirical
data.
26. This requirement can also be found in Art. 7 of the Dutch guidelines for
legislative drafting, which states: ‘Before deciding to introduce a regula-
tion, the following steps shall be taken: a. knowledge of the relevant
facts and circumstances shall be acquired; b. the objectives being aimed
at shall be defined in the most specific, accurate terms possible; c. it
shall be investigated whether the objectives selected can be achieved
using the capacity for self-regulation in the sector or sectors concerned
or whether government intervention is required; d. if government inter-
vention is necessary, it shall be investigated whether the objectives in
view could be achieved by amending or making better use of existing
instruments, or, if this proves impossible, what other options are avail-
able; e. the various options shall be compared and considered with
care.’
27. M. Andenas and S. Zleptnig, ‘Proportionality and Balancing in WTO
Law: A Comparative Perspective’, 20(1) Cambridge Review of Interna-
tional Affairs (2007), 71-92, at 76.
28. L. Tremblay, ‘An Egalitarian Defense of Proportionality-Based Balanc-
ing’, 12 (4) International Journal of Constitutional Law (2014), 864-90
at 865.
29. A. Barak, ‘Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience’, 57(2) University
of Toronto Law Review (Spring 2007), 369-82, at 374.
The interesting thing about the proportionality test is
that it requires rational legal arguments in the decision-
making process. As Craig has rightfully claimed, those
arguments need to be justified in a public deliberative
process.30 Our intention is to show to what extent this
actually happens during the preparation of our legisla-
tive drafts.
3 Analysis of the Cases
Regarding both cases, we will start with an introduction
of the legislative proposal and a short overview of the
relevant studies. After that, we investigate to what
extent the studies played a role with regard to the differ-
ent elements of the proportionality test. We conclude
each case study with a brief conclusion of our findings.
3.1 The Alcohol Lock Case
In 2008, the Dutch government presented a legislative
draft to amend the Road Traffic Act (RTA) 1994 in
order to introduce a so-called ‘alcohol lock pro-
gramme’.31 This was meant to reduce the number of
victims of road accidents due to drunken driving. The
annual number of road deaths in this period was 800 and
a case-control study in the police district of Tilburg
concluded that at least 25% of these fatalities were
caused by alcohol use.32 This would result in at least 200
casualties a year. Seventy-five per cent of the victims are
the result of drunken drivers with a blood alcohol con-
tent (BAC) of 1.3 g/l or more. Studies by the Ministry
of Transport, Public Works and Water Management
revealed that, although the number of offences is slowly
decreasing, this is not the case for the category of heavy
drinkers who are caught with a BAC of 1.3 g/l or
more.33 Moreover, the minister concludes from accident
statistics that existing measures to reduce the use of
alcohol in traffic, such as media campaigns and educa-
tion programmes, have had limited effect on this catego-
ry of drivers.34
The draft to amend the RTA 1994 argues that new
measures to prevent alcohol abuse are necessary and that
the introduction of an ‘alcolock’ (breath alcohol ignition
interlock) would be an appropriate tool to make heavy
drinkers learn how to separate the use of alcohol from
driving a motor vehicle.35 The idea is to amend the
existing procedure for driving license suspension and
mandatory educational measures for offenders focused
30. P. Craig, ‘Unreasonableness and Proportionality in UK Law’, in E. Ellis
(ed.), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Oxford:
Hart 1999), 85-106, at 99-100. See also P. Craig, ‘The Nature of
Unreasonableness Review’, 66 Current Legal Problems (2013), at
131-67.
31. Parliamentary Papers II 2008-2009 31 896 nr. 2.
32. M. Mathijssen and S. Houwing, The Prevalence and Relative Risk of
Drink and Drug Driving in the Netherlands: A Case-Control Study in
the Tilburg Police District (Leidschendam: SWOV Institute for Road
Safety Research, R-2005-9).
33. Parliamentary Papers II 2008-2009, 31 896, nr. 3, at 7.
34. Ibid., at 8.
35. Ibid., at 8.
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on the use of alcohol in traffic with the possibility to
participate in the alcolock programme at one’s own
expense. When people are selected to participate in the
programme, their car will be equipped with the alco-
lock, which prevents ignition of the engine. Every time
the driver wants to start the car, he is submitted to a
breath test. In case the BAC is too high, the engine will
not start. Even while driving, the alcolock requires ran-
dom retests. This is to prevent the person from being
drunk while driving and to avoid that another person
takes the breath test before starting the car. The period
of being sentenced to have your car equipped with a
lock is in principle two years. In case someone sabotages
the alcohol lock or gets round it by driving in another
car, this period will be lengthened, the driving license
will be declared invalid or in the worst case, someone
must go to jail. The alcolock is used to enable drivers to
prove they are no longer alcohol-dependent when par-
ticipating in traffic.
Technically, the alcolock is equipped with a recorder.
Every breath test is recorded and can be read out by a
counsellor attributed to the programme. On a regular
basis, the counsellor and the convicted person meet each
other to discuss the results of the breathalyser in order
to see if additional measures are necessary.
3.1.1 Empirical Research
The explanatory memorandum of the legislative draft
enabling the introduction of the alcolock programme
refers to various empirical studies in the United States,
Canada and Sweden since 1997.36 These would show
that drivers who participate in the programme on aver-
age reoffend 80% less often than drivers with temporary
suspensions of their license. The drafters in particular
refer to a study by Beirness and Robertson,37 concluding
that a number of conditions must be fulfilled to make
the programme effective. There should be: an obligation
in the sense that drivers may only use their vehicles if an
alcolock is installed; a code on the driving license is nec-
36. M. Weinrath, ‘The Ignition Interlock Program for Drunk Drivers: A Mul-
tivariate Test, 43(1) Crime Delinq. (1997), at 42-59. R. Voas and
A.S. Tippetts, ‘Requiring Interlocks for Reinstatement: The Florida
Example’. Paper Presented at the 7th Annual International Ignition
Interlock Symposium, Bachelor Gulch, Colorado, October 22-24
(1997). K. Beck, W. Rauch, E. Baker & A. Williams, ‘Effects of Ignition
Interlock License Restrictions on Driver on Multiple Alcohol Offences: A
Random Trial in Maryland’, 89 American Journal of Public Health
(1999), at 1696-1700. R. Voas, P. Marques, A. Tippetts & D. Beirness,
‘The Alberta Interlock Program: The Evaluation of a Province-Wide Pro-
gram on DUI Recidivism’, 94(12) Addiction (1999), at 1849-1859,
L. Venzina, ‘The Quebec Alcohol Interlock Program: Impact on Recidi-
vism and Crashes’, in D.R. Mayhew and C. Dussault (eds.), Alcohol,
Drugs and Traffic Safety 0 T2002. Proceedings of the 16th International
Conference on Alcohol, Drugs and Traffic Safety. Montreal, August
4-9, 2002 (Quebec City: Societé de l’assurance automobile du Quebec;
2002), 97-104. B. Bjerre, ‘Primary and Secondary Prevention of Drink-
ing and Driving by the Use of Alcolock Device and Program: The Swed-
ish Experience’, in P. Marques (ed.), Alcohol Ignition Interlock Devices.
Volume II 2005: Research, Policy, and Program Status (Oosterhout, the
Netherlands: International Council on Alcohol, Drugs, and Traffic Safety
(ICADTS), 2005). J. Frank, R. Raub, R. Lucke & W. Wark, ‘Illinois Igni-
tion Interlock Evaluation’, in Proceedings of the 16th International Con-
ference on Alcohol, Drugs and Traffic Safety (2002), at 105-9.
37. Parliamentary Papers II 2008-2009, 31 896, nr. 3, at 9.
essary to inform the police about participation in the
programme during routine inspections; the obligation to
take part in the programme should be based on adminis-
trative law instead of criminal law; there needs to be
compliance-monitoring by reading out the data from the
breathalyser registration unit and a regular inspection of
the alcolock to detect attempts of fraud; the programme
needs to be flexible in the sense that the duration can be
adjusted to the individual behaviour of the participants
in the programme on the basis of the data from the reg-
istration unit.
Based on a study by SWOV,38 counting on an annual
participation rate of between 2,000 and 6,750 persons
and a maximum number of participants of 13,500 after
two years, it was estimated that introduction of the alco-
lock should lead to an annual reduction of between
twenty-five and thirty road deaths and a decrease in the
number of people who have to be hospitalised of
between 250 and 300. This estimation was based on the
following assumptions: a two-year programme; partici-
pation in the programme as soon as possible after the
offence; regular monitoring of the data from the regis-
tration unit; extension of the alcolock programme (each
time for six months) in case offenders have shown to be
unable to separate the use of alcohol while driving; no
direct participation in the programme for offenders with
a BAC above 2.1 g/l (experienced drivers) and 1.8 g/l
(starting drivers).
Regarding the latter, the explanatory memorandum
points to several studies showing that an alcolock pro-
gramme could also be successful for the latter group of
heavy drinkers,39 but the people in this category should
first undergo a test whether they are fit to follow the
programme. As far as the practical functioning of the
alcolock is concerned (e.g. can it be installed in all cars,
does the retest not pose dangers when conducted during
driving? etc.), the drafters point to a pilot project in
which eighty persons tested two different alcolocks dur-
ing a period of eleven weeks.40 This pilot showed no
practical difficulties in the daily use of the alcolock. The
draft also point to studies showing that once the alcolock
is removed from a car, there are hardly any positive
effects anymore on the alcohol use. That is why a period
of at least two years is recommended for participation in
the programme.41 A longer period is believed to have
more durable results on the driving behaviour of offend-
ers. Moreover, reference is made to foreign studies
showing that the introduction of an alcolock works bet-
ter in case it is accompanied by a counselling and guid-
ance programme.42 This is why the draft introduces a
38. SWOV institute for road safety research, Geschat effect op de verkeers-
veiligheid van een alcoholslotprogramma (ASP) en de kosten-batenver-
houding ervan, Leidschendam, 2009.
39. Parliamentary Papers II 2008-2009, 31 896, nr. 3, at 13.
40. Seehttps:// www. rijksoverheid. nl/ binaries/ rijksoverheid/ documenten/
rapporten/ 2008/ 10/ 01/ demo -alcoholslot -onderzoeksresultaten/ demo -
alcoholslot -onderzoeksresultaten. pdf.
41. Parliamentary Papers II, 2008-2009, 31 896, nr. 3, at 54.
42. P. Marques, A. Tippets, R. Voas, E. Danseco & D. Beirness, ‘Predicting
DUI Offenses with the Alcohol Interlock Recorder’, 33 Accident Analy-
sis and Prevention (2001), at 609-19; P. Marques, R. Voas &
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parallel programme focused on the motivation and
learning of participants, which should not be seen as an
addiction treatment and rehabilitation programme
though, because the programme is not set up to ‘cure’
alcoholics but to teach regular (non-addicted) drivers to
separate the use of alcohol from participating in traffic.43
3.1.2 Aims of the Draft
The first thing to be noticed in the draft is that the text
of the explanatory memorandum is rather vague on
what are the exact goals of the alcolock programme. The
proposal presents specific targets in terms of an estima-
ted decrease in the number of (fatal) casualties, but the
empirical evidence on how these targets are going to be
accomplished is rather weak. Problematic is also the lack
of clarity on the relationship between the introduction
of alcolock programmes in other legal systems and the
estimated drop in (fatal) accidents in the Netherlands.
Of course one could argue that the best possible ‘proof’
of the real-life effects of alcolock programmes can be
found by looking at countries where there is experience
with these systems. However, the problem is that very
little information is provided with regard to the context
in which these programmes functioned abroad and there
is also no information about the longitudinal effects.
This makes it highly problematic to extrapolate the
findings abroad to the Dutch situation.
3.1.3 Suitability
Striking is that the explanatory memorandum leans
heavily on evaluation studies and pilot projects in other
countries; most notably the United States, Canada, Aus-
tralia and Sweden, but the regulatory context in these
countries might very well be quite different from the
one in the Netherlands. Remarkable is, therefore, that a
1994 SWOV study, which is not mentioned in the
explanatory memorandum, concluded that
it would be of benefit to conduct an experiment with
alcohol locks in the Netherlands. Sufficient knowl-
edge is available to set up a sound experiment, linked
to an effectivity study. Such an experiment would
only be useful, however, if the user is also subjected
to intensive supervision.44
Such a study has never been undertaken, though. The
aforementioned pilot project was not set up as a study to
measure the effectiveness of the programme, but merely
served to detect potential practical and technical prob-
D. Timken, ‘Preliminary Outcomes from a Texas Manual-Based Group
Motivational Intervention Supplement for Court-Stipulated Interlock
DUI Offenders’, in Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on
Alcohol, Drugs and Traffic Safety (2004). G.P. Marques, R. Voas,
S. Tippetts, K. Blackman, D. Timken & C. Field, ‘Motivational Interven-
tion Keyed to Interlock Use Reduces the Rate of Positive BAC Tests’, in
B. Logan, D. Isenschmid, J. Walsh, D. Beirness & J. Morland (eds.), Pro-
ceedings of the T2007 Joint International Meeting of TIAFT/ICADTS/
IIS, August 26-30, Seattle (WA: ICADTS; 2007).
43. Parliamentary Papers II, 2008-2009, 31 896, nr. 3, at 27-30.
44. J. van der Sluis, ‘Alcoholslot Onderzoek naar de ervaringen in het bui-
tenland en de mogelijkheden in Nederland Leidschendam’ (Stichting
Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Verkeersveiligheid SWOV, 1994), at 4.
lems in the implementation of alcolocks. From a method-
ological perspective, only a well-designed experiment
could deliver solid evidence about the effectiveness of
such a programme in the Netherlands.
The Council of State also pointed to weaknesses in the
programme due to (1) the lack of a parallel mandatory
addiction treatment programme aimed to take away the
root cause of the problems of the group of heavy drink-
ers on which the alcolock programme is focused; (2) the
susceptibility to fraud of the programme, shown for
example by the refusal to introduce additional sobriety
inspections (e.g. think of people with an alcolock notifi-
cation on their driving license who might keep driving
with borrowed cars); (3) potential overlap with criminal
law measures, which can make that offenders cannot be
submitted to the alcolock programme due to, among
other things, the need to avoid ne bis in idem problems.
This not only delays the implementation of the pro-
gramme, but could also increase the uncertainty among
drunken drivers about what lies in wait for them and
affect the willingness to participate.45 The government
does not respond by referring to other research in the
follow-up to the advice by the Council of State.
The debate of the draft in parliament did not really raise
new issues with regard to the suitability of the pro-
gramme and the research conducted in that respect with
one important exception. Serious worries were cast con-
cerning the advice by the Dutch Association of Psychia-
trists with respect to the dangers of allowing alcoholics
(addicts) to enter into the programme without a manda-
tory rehab programme. Initially, the government had
ignored this advice, but in reaction to questions in par-
liament about this, an elaborate response was given
referring to a wide list of foreign studies with respect to
the consequences of allowing alcoholics into alcolock
programmes. The government concludes on the basis of
evaluation of foreign programmes and studies that these
programmes would not be less effective for people with
an alcohol addiction.46
3.1.4 Necessity
Although the draft underlines the fact that alternative
policy measures, such as information campaigns (e.g. the
‘Bob campaign’ focusing on the responsibility of sober
drivers taking friends for a night out), education pro-
grammes and regular sobriety inspections have not
delivered the desired results,47 no impact assessment
seems to have been conducted. This means that a sys-
tematic comparison between potential alternative policy
measures, such as mandatory medical treatment and tar-
geted rehab programmes, is lacking.48
As far as comparative studies are concerned, these con-
centrate on experiences with alcolocks in other countries
and do not include other policy alternatives. Hence, it is
45. Parliamentary Papers II 2008-2009, 31 896, nr. 4, at 4-7.
46. Parliamentary Papers II 2009-2010, 31 896, nr. 7, at 4.
47. Ibid., at 8.
48. According to § 4.43 (b) of the directive on legislative drafting, the
explanatory memorandum should provide an overview of how alterna-
tives to legislation have been taken into account.
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no wonder that alcolock programmes come out on top.
The statement in the explanatory memorandum that no
other measures abroad can be found with a similar effect
to the alcolock, therefore, sounds rather pretentious.49
After all, one cannot know whether less intrusive and
equally effective measures are available, unless a system-
atic study of potential alternatives is undertaken.
Additionally, there is hardly any mentioning in the draft
about the methodological strengths and weaknesses of
the existing studies in this field.50 This makes it difficult
to rate the outcomes of the available foreign studies con-
cerning the effectiveness of alcolock programmes.
The Council of State does not really discuss the lack of
serious attention for alternatives to the alcolock pro-
gramme and/or the strengths and weaknesses of the
studies mentioned in the explanatory memorandum. In
parliament, this is also not a serious issue. Both State
Councillors and Members of Parliament (MPs) seem to
depend quite heavily on the information provided by
the government in the draft and did not carry out inde-
pendent research on their own nor do they point to the
lack of attention for potential alternatives to the alcolock
instrument because they seem focused on the single pol-
icy instrument the draft presents. This is also the only
instrument supported by (empirical) data and research.
3.1.5 Proportionality stricto sensu
In terms of ‘costs and benefits’, the draft mentions an
estimated decrease in the number of road deaths and
serious injuries, depending on the number of partici-
pants and the time between driving license suspension
or revocation and active participation in the programme.
It also predicts the costs for individual participants in
the programme to get the alcolock installed. These costs
would lie somewhere between 1,300 and 2,000. The
draft also mentions that the exact costs are hard to pre-
dict because of the fact that the alcolock programme
represents ‘work in progress’. Costs would depend on
competition between the suppliers of alcolock devices,
the number of alcolocks that are going to receive a cer-
tificate from the Central Bureau for Driving Licenses
and the number of participants in the programme. What
the draft makes clear, though, is that all costs for the
certification and installation of the alcolock, the mainte-
nance of the registration system, the monitoring of the
results from alcolock registration unit and the cost for a
driving license with an alcolock notification need to be
covered by the participants.51
The Council of State warned that the participation in
the programme might prove to be disappointingly low
because of the costs involved in participating. After the
introduction of the alcolock in 2011, however, the costs
49. Parliamentary Papers II 2008-2009, 31 896, nr. 3, at 9.
50. At the European Union level, this is somewhat different because serv-
ices of the European Commission are instructed to explain the meth-
odological strengths of evaluations as soon as external evaluations are
transferred to Staff working documents. See European Commission,
Better Regulation Toolbox (2015), at 364-74. For an example,
Seehttps:// ec. europa. eu/ food/ sites/ food/ files/ gfl_ fitc_ comm_ staff_
work_ doc_ 2018_ part1_ en. pdf, at 23.
51. Ibid., at 30.
for participating appeared to be much higher than the
estimated maximum of 2,000. On average, the costs
turned out to be around 5,000. This meant that many
offenders were not financially capable of participating
because of the costs. Consequently, their driving license
was suspended for five years because the ‘voluntary’
alternative of participation in the alcolock programme
was de facto unfeasible. In 2015, the AJD of the Council
of State declared the regulation on which the ‘educa-
tional measure’ of the alcolock was based unlawful
because it violates the proportionality principle
enshrined in Article 3:4 of the General Administrative
Law Act.52
The AJD argued that the regulation did not take the
personal situation of different drivers and their depend-
ence on a driving license sufficiently into account. The
possibility for people to continue driving under the
realm of a special license linked to an alcolock pro-
gramme with reasonable costs had been a cornerstone of
the amendments to the Road Traffic Act 1994, but there
was no serious alternative to maintain a limited driving
license without partaking in the alcolock programme.
Apart from that, the AJD revealed that in the meantime,
numerous cases had been brought before it in which the
defendants claimed that participation in the programme
was financially impossible. Some offenders did not own
a car and were caught driving a borrowed or rental car.
In case offenders cannot participate purely because of
the height of the costs, the AJD found that the educa-
tional measure on which the alcolock rests fails to take
the personal circumstances of offenders, who sometimes
rely on a driving license for their job (e.g. taxi drivers
and car mechanics), into account. This leads to a viola-
tion of the proportionality principle.
Last but not least, the AJD noticed that participating in
an alcolock coincided with the possibility of imposing
criminal sanctions on drunken drivers, which the
Supreme Court had deemed problematic in light of
Article 6 ECHR.53 On both accounts (costs and benefits
and criminal sanctions), the government responded in
its additional report. Regarding the possibility of con-
currence of sanctions, the government refers to the pub-
lic prosecutor service and the judiciary without answer-
ing to the arguments of the AJD. With respect to the
cost and benefits, the government mainly stresses that
the costs are reasonable, considering the fact that enter-
ing into the programme allows offenders to continue to
drive an automobile, which would otherwise be impossi-
ble. In the parliamentary debate, one mainly sees a repe-
tition of arguments already brought forward by the
Council of State and a reminder that the government
should strive to keep the costs of the programme for
participants as low as possible.
3.1.6 Intermediary Conclusion
We may conclude that on all three accounts of propor-
tionality (suitability, necessity and costs and benefits),
52. ABRvS 4 March 2015; ECLI:NL:RVS (2015), 622.
53. HR 3 March 2015 S 14/04940; ECLI:NR:HR (2015), 434.
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the draft had serious shortcomings. The effectiveness of
the programme was based solely on foreign experiences,
but was not actually tested via an experiment as recom-
mended by SWOV; there has been no systematic study
of possible alternatives to an alcolock programme; the
balancing of costs and benefits for participating in the
programme appears to be built on quicksand for which
the Advisory Division of the Council of State had
warned prior to the bill being enacted, which turned out
to be pretty accurate in light of the case law of the AJD
of the same Council of State that followed upon the
implementation of the bill that introduced the alcolock.
3.2 The Case of the Right to Contact after
Partner Homicide
In the Netherlands, every year on average 26 children
lose one of their parents because of intimate partner
homicide. Regulating the right of contact after parental
intimate partner homicide, the draft of 2016 concerning
the right to contact after partner homicide introduces a
mandatory procedure according to which decisions
about contact between the children and the perpetrating
parent need to be made by a Juvenile court. These deci-
sions should be based on a request made by the Council
for Child Protection.54
54. The (translated) formal title of the draft is ‘Amendment of the Civil
Code in connection with the limitation of the right of contact or access
after parental intimate partner homicide’. Parliamentary Papers II
2012-2013, 33 552.
This Council for Child Protection is responsible for
assessing the personal circumstances of children who
lost one of their parents (usually the mother) because of
homicide by the other parent. The council is free to
obtain the children’s opinion to estimate whether con-
tact with the perpetrating parent is in their best interest.
No sooner than two years after the court’s decision the
parent is allowed to object to a negative decision from
the Juvenile court. The reason for this two-year ‘cooling
down’ period is to give children time to recover from
their (expected) traumatic experience. Moreover, the
idea is to keep children as much as possible out of the
conflicts between the families of the victim and the per-
petrating parent. The Juvenile court usually gives custo-
dy to a certified youth care facility.
According to the draft, reducing stress and protecting
the well-being of the children are the main reasons for
the introduction of the new procedure.55 Limiting con-
tact with and access to the children is a restriction of the
(remaining) parent’s right to family life as protected by
Article 8 of the ECHR. In the explanatory memoran-
dum to the draft, the government considers this restric-
tion to be a legitimate exception, which is lawful and
necessary in accordance with Article 8(2).56
55. Parliamentary Papers II 2015-2016, 34 518, nr. 3, at 2 (82% of the
involved children suffer stress) and at 4 (current legislation are insuffi-
cient to keep child’s life as peacefully as possible).
56. Parliamentary Papers II 2015-2016, 34 518, nr. 3, at 6.
Table 1 Outcome alcolock case
Explanatory memorandum Council of State House of Representatives
Empirical research Several (foreign) studies most-
ly about the positive experi-
ence with alcolocks
Referring to studies mentioned
in explanatory memorandum.
No other evidence
Referring to study mentioned
in explanatory memorandum.
No other evidence
Suitability Abstract goals Only foreign
studies about effects but
national study that advises to
conduct an experiment ig-
nored
Mentioned studies not entirely
convincing about suitability:
(1) lack of a parallel mandato-
ry addiction treatment (2) risk
of fraud and (3) concurrence
with criminal sanctions
Repetition of arguments by the
Council of State, but extra con-
cern regarding addicted per-
sons
Necessity No comparison of regulatory
alternatives: unsupported
claim that there are no rele-
vant alternatives
No attention for alternatives No attention for alternatives
Proportionality stricto sensu Costs are hard to predict
because of the fact that the
alcolock programme repre-
sents ‘work in progress’. Costs
depend on competition
between the suppliers of alco-
lock devices and the benefits
are difficult to express in mon-
etary terms
Serious doubts about costs due
to participation rate. Also con-
cerns about concurrence with
criminal sanctions not taken
into account
Repetition of arguments made
by Council of State and
emphasis on the importance of
keeping costs as low as possi-
ble
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3.2.1 Empirical Research
The study ‘Care for children after intimate partner
homicide’ from the Psychotrauma Centre of Utrecht
University’s Wilhelmina Children’s Hospital,57 men-
tioned in the explanatory memorandum,58 shows the
impact that partner homicide has on children, especially
in case they witnessed the crime. Although their grief
symptoms are relatively moderate compared with chil-
dren in a control group who have also lost a loved one in
another situation than partner homicide, more than half
of the children experience posttraumatic stress syn-
dromes.59
Nearly all children mentioned in the study received pro-
fessional assistance and most of them had some kind of
contact with the perpetrating parent in detention. Only
in a few cases there has been some pressure from the
perpetrator or from his family, but in the vast majority
of the cases, the will of the child concerning (no) contact
has been followed. According to the conclusions of the
Utrecht University study, each placement option may
work well and a (provisional) guardianship can provide
the opportunity to assess and plan what is in the best
interest of the child. Children should, however, not be
forced into having contact with the perpetrating parent,
nor should they be denied contact if such contact is
desired and reasonably possible. Providing stability and
safety of their situation is of great importance to the
children.60
It is remarkable that the explanatory memorandum leans
so heavily on the single study mentioned above,
although there were other studies available at the time.61
One of these studies, which compares data from ten dif-
ferent European Countries,62 claims there is a need for
reliable and comparable statistical data across countries
in order to better understand the phenomenon of inti-
mate partner homicide and to enable more effective pol-
icymaking improving the well-being of children, public
57. E. Alisic et al., Zorg voor Kinderen na Partnerdoding; onderzoek in
opdracht van het WODC (Utrecht: Universitair Medisch Centrum;
2014).
58. Parliamentary Papers II 2015-2016, 34 518, nr. 3, at 2.
59. Alisic et al. (2014), above n. 57, at 7.
60. Ibid., at 100-1.
61. See L. Lewandowski et al., ‘“He Killed My Mommy!” Murder or
Attempted Murder of a Child’s Mother’, 19(4) Journal of Family Vio-
lence (2004), 211-20; T. Wortham, ‘Intimate Partner Violence: Building
Resilience with Families and Children’, 23(2) Reclaiming Children and
Youth (2014), at 58-61; J. Hardesty et al., ‘How Children and their
Caregivers Adjust after Intimate Partner Femicide’, 29(1) Journal of
Family Issues (2008), at 100-24. E. Spencer-Carver, Social Support for
Children Who Had a Parent Killed by Intimate Partner Violence: Inter-
views with Mental Health Workers (Manhattan (Kansas): State Univer-
sity; 2008). This last study, by the way, mentions that the outcomes of
the studies may very well depend quite heavily on the chosen perspec-
tive. From a feminist theory perspective, the contact between the per-
petrating father and his children would probably meet with far more
scepticism than in case the same matter would be studied from the per-
spective of the resiliency theory.
62. C. Corradi and H. Stöckl, ‘Intimate Partner Homicide in 10 European
Countries: Statistical Data and Policy Development in a Cross-National
Perspective’, 11(5) European Journal of Criminology (2014), at 601-18.
health and welfare reform.63 This seems to suggest a
lack of reliable data at present, which raises questions
about the strength of the evidence base of the proposed
draft.
3.2.2 Aims of the Draft
According to the explanatory memorandum,64 the main
aim of the draft is to have as much stability and peace of
mind for children involved in intimate partner homicide
as possible. This does not sound as a very clear objective
because what counts as ‘peace and stability’ leaves much
room for interpretation. A second aim is to prevent
‘forced contact’ between children and their perpetrating
parent. So far, there is no mandatory procedure for the
decision about the visiting rights of the parent, which
runs the risk of making children a pawn in the game of
passing the buck between the families of the victim and
the perpetrator.
Although the aims are mentioned by the Utrecht Uni-
versity study, there is no empirical evidence showing
the relation between the new procedure in which a Juve-
nile court decides about the visiting arrangements and
the well-being of the children. In other words, this pro-
cedure is not the outcome of the study and is no part of
the conclusions either. In the current procedure, contact
between children and their convicted parent is possible
without a court decision. According to the explanatory
memorandum, this is considered unsatisfactory in prac-
tice.65 However, this is not an outcome of the Utrecht
University study. Moreover, the latter study reveals that
in 94% of the cases the will of the children (not) to visit
the perpetrating parent is already respected. This begs
the question: Why is new legislation required?
3.2.3 Suitability
Whether the new procedure will be an effective remedy
advancing the children’s mental stability and security
has not been explained in the Utrecht University study
nor in the explanatory memorandum. Actually, this
study only proves the contact between the children and
the perpetrating parent to be problematic. In the parlia-
mentary debate, spokesmen of the political parties call
this study, requested by parliament, important and val-
uable without explaining why.66 The Council of State is
sceptical here because the Council for Child Protection
already adheres to a protocol according to which the
court that decides over custody may take into account
the visiting rights and the interest of the children.
According to the Council of State, there is no reason to
believe that the advice by the Council for Child Protec-
tion is not taken seriously.67
May one reasonably expect the new procedure, accord-
ing to which there ought to be a court decision in every
case, to reduce the number of cases in which there is
63. Ibid., at 615. See also F. Koenraadt and M. Liem, ‘Fataal huiselijk
geweld: Doding van eigen kind, partner of ouder, Justitiële verkennin-
gen’, 36(8) Justitiële verkenningen (2010), at 100-14.
64. Parliamentary Papers II 2015-2016, 34 518, nr. 3, at 4.
65. Parliamentary Papers II 2015-2016, 34 518, nr. 3, at 4.
66. Parliamentary Proceedings II, at 73-3-3 and 73-3-5.
67. Parliamentary Papers II 2015-2016, 34 518, nr. 4, at 3.
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contact with the perpetrating parent against the child-
ren’s will? This is doubtful. Firstly, because there are
only a few cases found in the study in which there was
contact against the will of the children. Secondly, where
there was forced contact, this usually was the conse-
quence of a court order! In other words, from the per-
spective of avoiding involuntary contact between the
perpetrating parent and the children, leaving the deci-
sion to courts seems to be counter-intuitive. It is far
from self-evident to see courts as the most suitable deci-
sion makers in these kinds of cases if respect for the free
will of children is the main aim of the legislature. Apart
from that, going through a court procedure as such may
also have traumatic consequences for the children.68
The proposers (MPs) did not respond to the Council of
State’s judgement that the research findings could not
be seen as evidence to support this legislative initia-
tive.69
The proposed legislation appears to be based on the
assumption that the only reason for the homicide has
been the perpetrating parent’s intention to kill his part-
ner. In his study about partner homicide, however, De
Boer described many possible motives the perpetrator
parent might have had to commit homicide.70 In the
advice of the Association of Family Law and Divorce
Mediators, the question was raised whether the new
procedure would be suitable in cases where the perpe-
trator’s intent has been to defend the child against the
other parent.71 This raises doubt about the stereotype of
the perpetrating parent found in the legislative draft.
More importantly, though, there is no evidence that the
new procedure will lead to more peace and stability and
less forced contacts between children and the perpetrat-
ing parent.
3.2.4 Necessity
Could we ascertain the proposed procedure to be the
least intrusive measure reaching the aims of the bill? In
the Utrecht University study, no comparison has been
made between alternative modes of regulation. Like-
wise, the explanatory memorandum did not refer to any
study of alternatives, although, according to Section 2.3
of the Directives on legislative drafting, such a study is
mandatory.
In the course of the legislative process, some alternatives
are mentioned, such as a procedure according to which
only the scrutiny of the Council of child protection
would be mandatory, but the consequences of such
options have not been studied.72 Hence, we do not know
68. Alisic et al. (2014), above n. 57, at 101.
69. Parliamentary Papers II 2015-2016, 34 518, nr. 4, at 3.
70. A.P. de Boer, Partnerdoding. Een empirisch forensisch-psychiatrisch
onderzoek; proefschrift Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen (Arnhem:
Gouda Quint BV; 1990). In this study, De Boer examines 104 male and
20 female spouse killers who were submitted to a psychiatric examina-
tion. In 122 of the 124 cases, the psychiatrists concluded that, at the
time of the deed, there was a defective development and/or impair-
ment of the offender’s mind.
71. By letter of January 12. 2015, published in: Parliamentary Papers II
2012/2013, 33 552, nr. 3.
72. This lighter alternative was mentioned in the Council of State’s advice.
whether lighter alternatives to decision-making by a
Juvenile court would suffice to accomplish the aims of
proposed legislation.
In the initial draft, avoiding communication between
children and the perpetrating parent for at least two
years was meant to be the rule. The idea was that courts
would only decide to allow contact under exceptional
circumstances. This ‘no contact, unless …’ was altered
because of the advice of the Council of State. The core
of the council’s advice is to respect the balance between
caring for the child’s well-being on the one hand and
respecting the parent’s rights to contact on the other.73
In the revised draft, it is up to the court to make a situa-
tional decision. One might consider this to be a lighter
alternative in comparison with the original idea of the
draft, but no evidence is presented with regard to the
effectiveness of this measure in light of the aims of the
bill.
The proposed two-year cooling down term in which the
perpetrating parent is not allowed to object to the
court’s prohibition of contact with the children is con-
sidered to be a moderate measure. In its (neglected)
advice, the Council of State proposed to make courts
decide about this term, given the specific circumstances
of the case. In some cases, a shorter period could be in
the interest of the child.74 The proposing MPs do not
want to see the perpetrating parent to object to the court
within two years because of the child’s well-being.
Whenever it would be in the child’s favour, children
– but not the parents – are allowed to go to court.75 In
the parliamentary debate, two political parties differ
about the necessity of the two-year term. The term
should be three years (VVD) versus one year (D66).76
3.2.5 Proportionality stricto sensus
According to the explanatory memorandum, the costs
for the new procedure fit into the current budget of the
Council for Child Protection.77 This keeps the costs out
of sight, which makes a true balancing between the costs
and benefits impossible. In the parliamentary debate
about the proposal, nobody mentioned anything about
the costs or benefits.78
In the Netherlands, there are fourteen cases of parental
intimate partner homicide on average per year. The
total amount of children involved in those fourteen cases
is twenty-six. As we have seen in most cases, there is no
contact between the children and the perpetrating
parent against the will of the child.79 This means that
the new procedure given by this draft could only make a
73. The Council of State refers to the European Convention on Human
Rights, Art. 8. As the council stated, according to the convention, the
parent’s right to access does not depend on the child’s interest.
74. Parliamentary proceedings II, 2016-2017, May 10. 2017, at 73-3-1.
75. Parliamentary Papers II 2015-2016 34 518, nr. 4, at 10.
76. Parliamentary proceedings II, 2016-2017, at 73-3-2 and 73-3-5.
77. Parliamentary Papers II 2015-2016 34 518, nr. 3, at 8. According to the
explanatory memorandum, there is no need to increase the budget,
because of the small amount of cases. For the same reason, the Dutch
Council for the judiciary does not expect a substantial increase of the
workload.
78. Parliamentary proceedings, 10 May 2017, at 73-3-1 to 73-3-16.
79. In only two out of 84 cases.
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difference for a few cases per year, if it does at all. That
makes the balance between the legislative costs and ben-
efits doubtful. It is remarkable that nobody questioned
the balancing of the costs and benefits of this legal meas-
ure. Even the Council of State kept silent about this.
There is no obvious explanation for this. Various possi-
ble reasons might be applicable, such as the following: a
general feeling that the ends (should) justify the means
in this case, the ethical and moral sensitivity of the mat-
ter that prevents different actors in the legislative pro-
cess from critically questioning the costs, but it could
also be a simple lack of facts and data about costs and
benefits.
The new procedure in the draft limits the possibility of
the perpetrating parent to request the Juvenile court for
a new decision. This parent has to wait for two years
before being allowed to object in court. The drafters
expect the child to have less stress as a result of this two
years cooling down term. However, there are no empiri-
cal data available to estimate whether children would
suffer less stress as a result of the new procedure. Here
too, there is reasonable doubt about the balance between
costs and benefits. Nevertheless, those proposing the
bill believe the mentioned balance between the parent’s
right to contact and the well-being of the child to be an
argument in favour of this two-year term.80
3.2.6 Intermediary Conclusion
The initiators of the draft lean heavily on one particular
study, which has as its main outcome that children
should not be forced to have contact with the perpetrat-
ing parent in order to prevent further trauma.
This single study says little about the suitability of the
proposed draft and the more prominent role in the pro-
cedure for the Juvenile court because there are only a
few cases a year in which children are forced to have
contact against their will, and in some cases, it is even
the court that decides in favour of forced contact. Other
80. Parliamentary Papers II 2015-2016 34 518, nr. 4, at 9.
studies have not been included in the explanatory mem-
orandum of the draft.
As far as the necessity of the draft is concerned, there
has not been a study of potential alternatives to the pro-
posed procedure. Although the initial idea of a standard
two-year cooling down period has been amended
because of the criticism by the Council of State, this
cannot really be seen as a lighter regulatory alternative.
A procedure according to which only the scrutiny of the
Council of child protection would be mandatory, might
be seen as an alternative, but the consequences of this
option have also not been studied.
With regard to costs and benefits of the new procedure,
the draft does not provide any serious information. It is
claimed that the enactment of the bill will not invoke
new costs for the Council of child protection or for
Juvenile courts, but it is impossible to verify whether
this is actually true based on the evidence provided in
the draft.
5 Conclusion
Because the idea of evidence-based lawmaking appears
to gain increasing support in the circles of lawmakers,81
we have undertaken this study to look at the role that
empirical evidence plays with regard to the motivation
of normative decisions in legislative drafts. We have
used the proportionality principle as the lens through
which we studied two examples of legislative drafts. In
the alcolock case, more quantitative data and research,
such as statistics and accident data, were available, while
in the intimate partner homicide case, qualitative
81. S. Kealy and A. Forney, ‘The Reliability of Evidence in Evidence-Based
Legislation’, 20(1) European Journal of Law Reform (2018), at 40-66;
A. Seidman & R. Seidman, ‘ILTAM: Drafting Evidence-Based Legislation
for Democratic Social Change’, 9(2) Boston University Law Review
(2009), at 435-86.
Table 2 Outcome intimate partner homicide case
Explanatory memorandum Council of State House of Representatives
Empirical research One study mentioned Only
about impact
Referring to study mentioned
in memo. No other evidence
Referring to study mentioned
in memo. No other evidence
Suitability Abstract goals No evidence Mentioned study not convinc-
ing about suitability
Implicitly convinced about suit-
ability
Necessity No comparison of regulatory
alternatives
Skip ‘No contact, unless’
(adopted). Skip two years’
term to file objections (not
adopted)
Two political parties doubt
need for a court decision in
every case Parties differ about
two years’ term (less/more)
Proportionality stricto sensu Costs fit into current budget Balance between child’s well-
being and parent’s rights is
questioned Silent about small
number of cases with forced
contact
No comments about costs or
concurring values
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research inspired the drafters of new legislation. The
research question we raised reads:
To what extent is available empirical research used in
explanatory memoranda of two different legislative
drafts, namely the introduction of an alcohol lock
programme in traffic law and the protection of chil-
dren in cases of intimate partner homicide, in order
to justify normative legal choices, viewed through the
lens of the proportionality principle?
We divided this main question into three sub-questions.
The first one being whether there is a difference in how
the results from qualitative and quantitative studies in
the investigated cases play a role in the explanatory
memoranda of legislative drafts in order to justify nor-
mative choices, judged from a proportionality perspec-
tive? Here the answer is clearly negative.
In both our cases, the empirical evidence is primarily
used to show the seriousness of the problem, which the
draft tries to remedy. Empirical research does not serve
to prove the effectiveness of the proposed interven-
tions.82 Counter-evidence that might cast doubts as to
the suitability, necessity and the balancing of costs and
benefits is not presented. In the alcolock case, the draft
relies heavily on foreign experiences without much
information about the context in which these relatively
new programmes operated abroad. In the intimate part-
ner homicide case, the entire draft basically leans on a
single study. This study contains no evidence that the
proposed procedure to let a court decide about the visi-
tation rights of perpetrating parents with their children
will satisfy the aims of the draft. This includes the
avoidance of forced contact. In this case, history learns
that there have very few occasions where contact
between the perpetrating parent and his children was
involuntary. In the handful of cases where this was dif-
ferent, it was usually the result of a Juvenile court’s
order. This would seem to make it unlikely that the pro-
posed measures will prevent forced contact and reduce
stress for children. In both cases, there has not been an
empirical study of possible lighter regulatory alterna-
tives.
As to the question whether relevant empirical evidence
is missing in the explanatory memoranda or not presen-
ted in a balanced manner, we can be brief. What is strik-
ing in the alcolock case is how little information is provi-
ded about the context in which different types of alco-
lock programmes were functioning abroad. More
importantly, however, the drafters neglected the advice
to conduct a sound experiment, which was already
advised by SWOV – a specialised research institute for
traffic safety research – in 1994 as the best way to study
the effectiveness of an alcolock programme. This study
is not mentioned anywhere in the explanatory memo-
randum. Taking this into account, it is not surprising
that alcolock programmes come out as the best possible
82. This corresponds with earlier findings in research such as: R.A.J. van
Gestel & M.M. Menting, ‘Ex ante Evaluation and Alternatives to Legis-
lation: Going Dutch?’, 32(3) Statute Law Review (2011), at 1-18.
remedy to prevent drunken driving. When drafters only
look to research concerning these kinds of programmes
and do not include studies of possible regulatory alter-
natives, these programmes will automatically come out
on top. As to the costs of the programme, the Advisory
Division of the Council of State already argued that the
estimation of costs and benefits was unrealistic. This
later turned out to be true when participants of the alco-
lock programme filed a suit against the government
because the regulation violated the proportionality prin-
ciple due to the fact that the costs for individual partici-
pants were unreasonably high.
Regarding the intimate partner homicide case, again not
all relevant empirical evidence is presented in the draft,
and the evidence that is provided sometimes seems to be
interpreted rather one-sidedly. The Utrecht University
study, for example, reveals that in 94% of the cases, the
will of the children to not visit the perpetrating parent
was respected by the Council of child protection. This
raises doubts as to whether the existing procedure
should be changed by introducing a mandatory court
decision concerning visitation rights. Other comparative
studies, not included in the draft, cast doubts with
respect to the reliability of the existing empirical data.
What is striking is that the Council of State does not
seem to be willing or able to critically assess the rather
thin evidence on which the draft is based.
Finally, we have to ask ourselves how the lack of atten-
tion for empirical (counter-) evidence that does not sup-
port the aims of the draft both by the drafters and by
organisations responsible for legislative scrutiny, such as
the Council of State, can be explained. Vick’s explana-
tion that evidence and research that is ‘closer’ to what
lawyers – including legislative drafters – are familiar
with does not seem to hold ground in both cases,
because there appears to be little difference between
how the quantitative research in the alcolock case and
the qualitative research in the intimate partner homicide
case was dealt with by the drafters. A more likely
explanation appears to be that factors other than the
methodological closeness of empirical research to the
drafters may provide an explanation here. Inspiration
might, for example, be drawn from the literature on
evaluation use.83
With regard to the use of the outcomes of (empirical)
evaluations, the literature discerns between instrumen-
tal, conceptual and symbolic use. Instrumental use is the
direct application of knowledge stemming from research
to improve certain policies; conceptual use refers to the
situation where no direct action has been undertaken on
the basis of the evidence but where people’s under-
83. M. Alkin and J. King, ‘The Historical Development of Evaluation Use’,
37(4) American Journal of Evaluation (2016), at 568-79; B. de Laat &
K. Williams, ‘Evaluation use within the European Commission (EC): Les-
sons for the Evaluation Commissioner’, in M. Loud and J. Mayne (eds.),
Enhancing Evaluation Use: Insights from Internal Evaluation Units
(Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications; 2014), at 147-74; A. Balthasar,
‘Institutional Design and Utilization of Evaluation: A Contribution to a
Theory of Evaluation Influence Based on Swisse Experience’, 33(3) Eval-
uation Review (2009), at 226-56; D. Fleischer and C. Christie, ‘Evalua-
tion Use’, 30(2) American Journal of Evaluation (2009), at 158-75.
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standing has been affected; symbolic use concerns the
situation in which the mere existence of research or
evaluation is used to convince stakeholders rather than
any aspect of the outcomes of the research.84 Looking at
our two cases, one gets the impression that the way in
which empirical research is applied in the process of leg-
islative drafting is predominantly ‘symbolic’. This
would indicate that it is not the type of research, the
methodological closeness to lawyers, the validity of the
research or the conclusiveness of the outcomes that
determines whether empirical research will be taken into
account. Instead, empirical research appears to be pri-
marily used to defend politically desired outcomes.
Especially in the more sensitive case of the intimate
partner homicide, legislative drafters might realise that,
for example, State Councillors and MPs will find it very
difficult to critically assess research that claims to sup-
port victims of a horrible crime. On a deeper level, as
Rachlinski has argued, evidence-based law is problemat-
ic in itself,85 because the scientific rationality in the leg-
islative process often conflicts with deeply held moral
and political beliefs. The question is to what extent one
may expect from legislative drafters acting on behalf of a
politically responsible minister that they are going to use
empirical evidence running against the normative (e.g.
moral, ideological, political) choices of their political
superiors? Is it not more likely that draftsmen will be
inclined to look for facts, arguments and empirical
research that can be used to support the passing of the
draft, while leaving the counter-arguments and counter-
evidence to the opposition in Parliament?
In case the latter would be true, we believe our proposal
to assess legislative drafts through the lens of our pro-
portionality test becomes all the more important. Not
only is it a way to systematically study how empirical
data and scientific evidence are used to prove that pro-
posals for new legislation are suitable to accomplish the
aims of the draft, the necessity of the interventions and
the balancing of costs and benefits, but it can provide
courts afterwards with valuable information to strike
down pieces of legislation that infringe upon the rights
of citizens in a disproportionate manner because empiri-
cal data and scientific evidence with regard to the pro-
posed solution to certain policy problems were ignored.
In other words, courts opting for a process-oriented
review could perhaps benefit from the fact that during
the preparatory phase, the outcomes of the proportion-
ality test were set aside. By doing so, the ex post evalua-
tion of legislation by courts and the ex ante evaluation of
legislative drafts by legislative scrutiny boards, such as
the Council of State, might re-enforce each other. In
case both draftsmen and political actors start to realise
that courts will no longer shy away from a stringent pro-
portionality review, they could become more careful
84. See K. Johnson, S. Toal, J. King, F. Lawrenz & B. Volkov, Research on
Evaluation Use: A Review of the Empirical Literature 1968 to 2005’,
30(3) American Journal of Evaluation (2009), at 378.
85. J. Rachlinski, ‘Evidence-Based Law’, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 901 (2011).
with the way in which empirical data and scientific evi-
dence are used to promote new pieces of legislation.
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